Gender Role Attitudes and Marital Sorting: Implications for Household Inequality*

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Abstract

We study how gender role attitudes (GRA)—beliefs about appropriate roles for men and women—affect marital sorting and intrahousehold allocations. Using data from the UK Household Longitudinal Study and a multidimensional matching model, we estimate the contribution of GRA to joint marriage utility alongside several other traits. Sorting on GRA is quantitatively important, with a contribution to marital surplus comparable to that of education. A decomposition of joint utility reveals three main dimensions, one of which loads heavily on GRA. This dimension strongly predicts intrahousehold allocations, including spouses' shares of housework, childcare, earnings, and paid labor. Overall, GRA emerge as a key determinant of assortative matching and a significant factor shaping intrahousehold behavior and gendered labor market outcomes.

Keywords: Assortative matching, Marriage market, Gender role attitudes, Social norms, Intrahousehold allocations

JEL Codes: D13, J12, J16

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1 Introduction

Who marries whom has fundamental implications for household behavior, gender inequality, and the distribution of economic resources (e.g., Becker, 1973, 1974, 1981; Pollak, 1990; Weiss, 1997; Choo and Siow, 2006; Chiappori et al., 2026). Marital sorting shapes how couples allocate market work, housework, and childcare, influencing both within-household inequality and broader labor market outcomes. Although a large empirical literature documents strong assortative matching on characteristics such as age, education, health, and personality traits, remarkably little is known about sorting on beliefs that directly govern household specialization and bargaining (Chiappori and Salanié, 2023).

This paper focuses on gender role attitudes (GRA), i.e., individuals' beliefs about the appropriate roles of men and women in the household and the labor market. These attitudes influence labor supply decisions, household specialization, and intrahousehold bargaining, and are widely viewed as a key determinant of gender inequality (Fernández, 2013, 2025; Alesina et al., 2013; Fortin, 2015; Bertrand et al., 2015; Cavapozzi et al., 2021; Bau and Fernández, 2023; Cortes et al., 2025). Unlike education or income, GRA capture normative beliefs and can enter household decisions directly by shaping preferences over specialization, perception of fairness, and bargaining positions (see, among others, Siminski and Yetsenga, 2022; Ichino et al., 2026; Cavapozzi et al., 2024; Charles et al., 2025). Despite their importance, they have received little attention in empirical investigations of the marriage market.[1]

We make two main contributions. First, we quantify assortative matching on gender role attitudes in the marriage market and assess its importance relative to standard traits, such as education. Second, we examine how sorting on gender role attitudes predicts the allocation of housework, childcare, paid labor, and earnings within couples. Together, these two strands of analysis shed light on marital sorting as a mechanism through which beliefs can reinforce or mitigate intrahousehold gender inequality.

To perform this analysis, we estimate a multidimensional structural matching model that recovers complementarities in joint marital utility. A simple correlation between spouses' attitudes cannot be interpreted as a preference for homogamy, since such a cor-

[1] A notable exception is the matching framework developed by Goussé et al. (2017), in which marital externalities arise through home production that depends on spouses' education and family attitudes.

relation reflects the joint distribution of traits, interactions across attributes, and equilibrium sorting patterns. Our approach builds on Dupuy and Galichon (2014) and extends the matching model of Choo and Siow (2006) from multiple discrete to multiple continuous attributes for both partners. This framework allows us to identify the underlying complementarities that drive assortative matching in a frictionless marriage market with transferable utility.

We apply this framework to data on white partners from the UK Household Longitudinal Study, which provides rich measures of gender role attitudes alongside detailed information on couples' characteristics and behaviors.[2] We find strong and economically meaningful assortative matching on gender role attitudes. The contribution of these attitudes to joint marital utility is comparable in magnitude to that of education, a canonical driver of marital matching. Moreover, the rich multidimensional sorting patterns observed in the data can be well approximated by a small number of indices.[3] Among the three dominant indices, one loads heavily on gender role attitudes, while the other two primarily capture age and education. This result highlights the central role of belief-based traits, along with standard socioeconomic characteristics, in shaping marriage market outcomes.

We then examine how these indices predict intrahousehold allocations.[4] The GRA-related index emerges as a powerful predictor of household specialization. Couples with more egalitarian gender role attitudes divide housework, childcare, paid work, and earnings more evenly, while couples with more traditional attitudes exhibit substantially greater specialization. These patterns closely align with well documented dimensions of gender inequality observed in labor market outcomes and suggest that gender norms not only reflect preferences for homogamy, but also have an instrumental value in household decision making.

In the spirit of Chiappori et al. (2024), we also conduct counterfactual experiments. Holding the estimated complementarities in joint utility fixed, we simulate how changes in the distribution of gender role attitudes would affect intrahousehold allocations. Shifts

[2]While our analysis focuses on the UK, the mechanisms we document — i.e., sorting on beliefs that govern household specialization — are likely to operate in many other advanced economies.

[3]To identify indices (i.e., weighted combinations of individual attributes that drive marital matching and contribute to joint utility), we use the "saliency analysis" proposed by Dupuy and Galichon (2014). See the next section for further details on this analysis.

[4]Using a similar approach, Chiappori et al. (2024) study the effects of sorting on child outcomes.

toward more traditional attitudes increase specialization in both housework and market labor, while shifts toward more egalitarian attitudes substantially reduce specialization. Although these counterfactuals are not causal, our results illustrate how marital sorting can act as a mechanism amplifying gender inequality, particularly for women with traditional gender role attitudes who match with similarly traditional partners. In particular, they tend to face heavier housework and childcare responsibilities and worse labor market outcomes.

Our analysis is guided by existing theories of marriage and household behavior. In bargaining-based models, individuals choose partners based on expected benefits from future bargaining (e.g., Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981; Pollak, 1985, 2019; Lundberg and Pollak, 1993). When spouses hold similar gender role attitudes, conflict and bargaining costs over the allocation of market and nonmarket work are likely to be lower, increasing the gains from marriage. This implies that similar GRA can enhance spouses' joint utility by facilitating agreement over household decisions.[5] Commitment-based models emphasize marriage as a device to sustain specialization or joint production (Becker, 1973, 1974; Mazzocco, 2007; Cigno, 2012; Voena, 2015; Theloudis et al., 2025; Velilla et al., 2026). In this framework, couples with traditional attitudes may use marriage to commit to specialization, while couples with egalitarian attitudes may commit to shared market and domestic responsibilities. Across a broad class of models, therefore, similarity in gender role attitudes raises joint utility, generating incentives for assortative matching.[6]

A related literature examines how gender norms affect marriage formation. Goussé et al. (2017) study how gender role attitudes affect assortative mating and specialization through home-production complementarities. We instead isolate the role of GRA in assortative mating beyond other traits and show how such sorting shapes household specialization, consistent with both production-based mechanisms and preferences for

[5]Consistent with this view, the collective household model of Chiappori (1992) can be extended to allow discordance in GRA to reduce both spouses' utilities and to let Pareto weights depend on gender role norms. Such an extension, however, would require additional identifying assumptions, e.g., that a spouse's Pareto weight responds to the partner's GRA, while the two individual utilities depend only on the degree of attitudinal discordance within the couple.

[6]Both bargaining-based and commitment models imply that sorting on gender norms is driven by economic complementarities that raise joint utility, and these complementarities in turn may arise from production complementarities supporting specialization (e.g., Becker, 1973, 1981; Baker and Jacobsen, 2007), or from time and consumption complementarities that lead to more egalitarian household arrangements (e.g., Lam, 1988; Lundberg and Pollak, 2007; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007; Lundberg et al., 2016).

attitudinal homogamy. Antman et al. (2021) show that marriage is less likely when partners hold dissimilar gender norms, while Bertrand et al. (2021) document how traditional norms reduce marriage prospects for highly educated or high-earning women (see also Sevilla-Sanz, 2010). Focusing on migrants within the United States, Charles et al. (2025) show that higher sexism (measured by state-level GRA where a woman was born and where she currently lives) is associated with lower ages of marriage and childbearing, as well as worse gender gaps in employment and wages. Our paper complements this work by focusing on equilibrium sorting patterns among married couples and quantifying the contribution of gender role attitudes to joint marital utility.

More broadly, our analysis relates to a large empirical literature documenting marital homogamy along a wide range of characteristics, including age, education, and income (Chiappori et al., 2020, 2026), physical traits such as height, weight, and BMI (Chiappori et al., 2012), health-related behaviors such as smoking, drinking, and sports activity (Chiappori et al., 2018, 2024), personality traits such as risk attitudes and the Big Five (Dupuy and Galichon, 2014), cultural traits (Goussé et al., 2023), and even zodiac signs (Ciscato et al., 2024) and genetic markers (Abdellaoui et al., 2022). Despite this extensive evidence, no study has examined whether sorting on gender role attitudes exists over and above these other dimensions of homogamy, nor quantified its contribution to joint marital utility. Our framework allows us to do so in a consistent manner.

Because gender role attitudes are observed in our data only after marriage, reverse causality is a potential concern. We address this issue in several ways.[7] First, we focus on younger couples with relatively short marital histories, for whom post-marriage attitudinal convergence is likely to be limited. Second, we perform a sensitivity analysis that replaces observed attitudes with predicted attitudes based on predetermined family background characteristics. Across these exercises, we continue to find strong assortative matching on gender role attitudes, suggesting that our results are unlikely to be driven by post-marriage adjustments in attitudes. We further assess robustness by detrending all characteristics to account for cohort-level changes in attributes (such as education, gender role attitudes, and body mass index) and by using alternative measures of gender role attitudes. Finally, we extend our analysis to nonwhite couples by incorporating ethnicity (a discrete variable) as an additional matching dimension. Across all specifications

[7]Our objective is not to identify causal effects of attitudes on household behavior, but to characterize equilibrium sorting patterns and their association with intrahousehold allocations.

and samples, our main estimates remain stable.

This paper contributes to several strands of the economics of family formation. First, we contribute to the literature on cultural assortative matching by focusing on a specific and economically salient belief, gender role attitudes, and by quantifying, for the first time, its contribution to joint marital utility relative to education, age, and personality.[8] Second, we contribute to the literature on marital sorting and between-household inequality (e.g., Fernández and Rogerson, 2001; Chadwick and Solon, 2002; Ermisch et al., 2006; Eika et al., 2019; Ciscato and Weber, 2020; Chiappori et al., 2024; Grebol et al., 2025) by showing that assortative matching on GRA can amplify gender inequality within households. Gender norms affect labor market outcomes not only directly but also through partner selection, as their effects are reinforced when individuals with similar attitudes match.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the matching framework. Section 3 describes the data and the measurement of gender role attitudes. Section 4 quantifies assortative matching and decomposes joint utility. It also examines the implications of sorting for intrahousehold allocations of childcare, domestic work, market work hours, and earnings, and presents counterfactual exercises. Section 5 addresses potential concerns regarding post-marital convergence and reverse causality. Section 6 reports robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.

2 Theoretical Framework

Following Dupuy and Galichon (2014), we consider a one-to-one, bipartite matching framework with transferable utility.[9] Men and women are characterized by a vector of observable characteristics $x \in \mathcal{X} = \mathbb{R}^{d_x}$ and $y \in \mathcal{Y} = \mathbb{R}^{d_y}$, with population densities f and g, respectively. A matching is described by a joint measure $\pi(x, y)$, which denotes

[8] Kalmijn (1994) highlights the importance of cultural similarity, proxied by occupational status, in fostering stable marital relationships. More recent economic work emphasizes broader forms of cultural proximity, relying on indices that aggregate life priorities, leisure activities, and religion (Goussé et al., 2023), or on indirect proxies, such as country of origin (Adda et al., 2025). While these studies establish that culture matters for marital sorting, existing measures are typically coarse and do not directly capture the attitudes that shape household specialization, bargaining, and the allocation of housework and market labor.

[9] The use of transferable utility is standard in this class of marriage market models; see, among others Choo and Siow (2006), Dupuy and Galichon (2014), Chiappori et al. (2018), and Chiappori et al. (2026). Models with nontransferable utility include Burdett and Coles (1997), Burdett and Wright (1998), and Coles and Francesconi (2011, 2019).

the probability that a man of type x is matched with a woman of type y. A match is feasible if and only if π has marginals $f(x)$ and $g(y)$, that is,

$$\pi \in \mathcal{M}(f,g) = \left\{ \pi : \ \pi(x,y) \geq 0, \ \int_{\mathcal{Y}} \pi(x,y)dy = f(x), \ \text{and} \ \int_{\mathcal{X}} \pi(x,y)dx = g(y) \right\}. \quad (1)$$

A match between a man of type x and a woman of type y generates a "systematic" joint utility $\Phi(x,y)$, as well as two partner-specific idiosyncratic utility components that capture unobserved heterogeneity. These idiosyncratic components induce random matching conditional on observables.

Individual preferences and unobserved heterogeneity. Each man of type x observes only a subset of women in the population, his *acquaintances*. Acquaintances are indexed by $k \in \mathbb{N}$ and characterized by observed attributes y_k and an idiosyncratic sympathy (love) shock ϵ_k. The utility of a man of type x from choosing woman k is therefore summarized by

$$U(x,y_k) + \sigma\epsilon_k,$$

where $U(x,y)$ denotes the systematic component of the man's utility, and $\sigma > 0$ governs the dispersion of unobserved preferences, capturing the intensity of unobserved heterogeneity in the market.

Symmetrically, each woman of type y chooses among her acquaintances, indexed by $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$ and characterized by (x_ℓ, η_ℓ), where η_ℓ is an unobserved idiosyncratic love shock for man ℓ. Her utility from choosing man ℓ is then given by

$$V(x_\ell,y) + \sigma\eta_\ell$$

where $V(x,y)$ is the systematic component of the woman's utility. The systematic utilities for the man and the woman sum up to determine the joint utility, i.e.,

$$U(x,y) + V(x,y) = \Phi(x,y).$$

Following Choo and Siow (2006) and Dupuy and Galichon (2014), we assume that $\{(y_k,\epsilon_k), k \in \mathbb{N}\}$ are points of a Poisson process on $\mathcal{Y} \times \mathbb{R}$ with intensity $dy \times e^{-\epsilon}d\epsilon$, and analogously that $\{(x_\ell,\eta_\ell), \ell \in \mathbb{N}\}$ are points of a Poisson process on $\mathcal{X} \times \mathbb{R}$ with intensity

$dx \times e^{-\eta} d\eta$. These assumptions imply extreme-value distributed idiosyncratic shocks and lead to closed-form matching probabilities.

Equilibrium matching. Individuals choose partners among their acquaintances to maximize their utility. A man of type x solves

$$\max_k \{U(x, y_k) + \sigma \epsilon_k\},$$

while a woman of type y solves

$$\max_\ell \{V(x_\ell, y) + \sigma \eta_\ell\}.$$

Under the distributional assumptions on ϵ and η, the conditional probability that a man of type x is matched with a woman of type y is

$$\pi_{Y|X}(y|x) = \frac{\exp[U(x,y)/\sigma]}{\int_{\mathcal{Y}} \exp[U(x,y')/\sigma] dy'}. \tag{2}$$

Similarly, the conditional probability that a woman of type y is matched with a man of type x is

$$\pi_{X|Y}(x|y) = \frac{\exp[V(x,y)/\sigma]}{\int_{\mathcal{X}} \exp[V(x',y)/\sigma] dx'}. \tag{3}$$

Imposing feasibility (equation (1)) and using conditions (2) and (3) yield the equilibrium joint matching distribution

$$\pi(x,y) = \exp\left(\frac{\Phi(x,y) - \theta(x) - \psi(y)}{2\sigma}\right), \tag{4}$$

where the functions $\theta(x)$ and $\psi(y)$ are defined as

$$\theta(x) = \sigma \log \int_{\mathcal{Y}} f(x)^{-1} \exp(U(x,y)/\sigma) dy,$$
$$\psi(y) = \sigma \log \int_{\mathcal{X}} g(y)^{-1} \exp(V(x,y)/\sigma) dx,$$

and can be interpreted as male and female reservation utilities associated with their

respective characteristics. The implied individual utilities satisfy

$$U(x,y) = \frac{\Phi(x,y) + \theta(x) - \psi(y)}{2} \quad \text{and} \quad V(x,y) = \frac{\Phi(x,y) - \theta(x) + \psi(y)}{2}. \tag{5}$$

Theorem 1 of Dupuy and Galichon (2014) establishes the existence of two unique functions, $\theta(x)$ and $\psi(y)$ (up to a constant), that recover the optimal matching (4) and the equilibrium allocation of joint surplus between partners (5).

Parametric specification. We parameterize the joint utility function as

$$\Phi(x,y) = x'Ay,$$

where A is a $d_x \times d_y$ dimensional matrix, called *affinity* matrix.[10] Each element A_{ij} captures the degree of complementarity between characteristic x_i of the man and characteristic y_j of the woman. Positive values of A_{ij} indicate positive assortative matching, while negative values imply substitutability, i.e., negative assortative matching.

The affinity matrix A is estimated by maximum likelihood. Given a sample of N matched couples $(x_n, y_n)_{n=1}^N$, the likelihood function is

$$\mathcal{L}(A) = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{n=1}^{N} \pi^A(x_n, y_n),$$

where π^A denotes the equilibrium matching distribution implied by A through expression (4).

Saliency analysis. To characterize the main dimensions of assortative matching, we perform a saliency analysis following Dupuy and Galichon (2014). The affinity matrix admits the following singular value decomposition

$$A = Q'\Lambda R,$$

where the matrix $\Lambda = \text{diag}(\lambda_1, \ldots, \lambda_H)$ contains non-increasing singular values, with $H = \min\{d_x, d_y\}$, which capture the relative importance of each sorting trait, while

[10] Similar functional forms are used by Dupuy and Galichon (2014), Ciscato et al. (2020), Ciscato and Weber (2020), and Chiappori et al. (2024).

columns Q and R are loading vectors that describe the nature of each dimension. Let us define the transformed indices $\tilde{x} = Qx$ and $\tilde{y} = Ry$. Joint utility can then be rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned}\Phi(x, y) &= x'Ay \\ &= (Qx)'\Lambda(Ry) \\ &= \tilde{x}'\Lambda\tilde{y} \\ &= \sum_{h=1}^{H} \lambda_h \tilde{x}_h \tilde{y}_h. \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

Each term $\lambda_h \tilde{x}_h \tilde{y}_h$ represents an independent dimension of assortativeness and captures the contribution of that dimension to joint utility.

The new indices $\tilde{x}$ and $\tilde{y}$ are such that $\tilde{x}_i$ and $\tilde{y}_j$ are complements if $i = j$, and neither complements nor substitutes if $i \neq j$. In other words, there is positive assortative matching between $\tilde{x}_i$ and $\tilde{y}_j$ for $i = j$ and no assortativeness for $i \neq j$. All things being equal, a man with a higher $\tilde{x}_i$ tends to match with a woman with a higher $\tilde{y}_i$. This decomposition provides a parsimonious representation of multidimensional sorting and allows us to identify the dominant traits driving equilibrium matching.

3 Data

Our analysis uses data from the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS).[11] We focus on heterosexual couples, married or cohabiting, observed in waves 2 (2010–2012) or 4 (2012–2014), as these waves include the key measures of gender role attitudes. If a couple is observed in both waves, we retain the earliest observation (wave 2) to avoid duplication and to limit, though not eliminate, concerns related to post-union attitudinal adjustments. In Section 5, we further address some of such concerns using predicted attitudes.

Matching attributes. Our primary trait of interest is gender role attitudes (GRA). We measure GRA using a standard battery of questions capturing internalized norms related to gender identity and the division of labor within the household (Fernández et al., 2004;

[11] The UKHLS is publicly available through UK Data Service. We use the 13th Edition (UK Data Service. SN: 6849, <http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6849-16>).

Fortin, 2005; Cortes et al., 2025; Fernández, 2025; Becker, 2026). Respondents indicate their level of agreement with the following four statements: (i) "A pre-school child suffers if his or her mother works"; (ii) "Family life suffers if the mother works full-time"; (iii) "Husband and wife should both contribute to household income"; and (iv) "The husband should earn the income while the wife stays at home." Responses are recorded on a five-point Likert scale, where 1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 4=disagree, and 5=strongly disagree. To ensure a consistent interpretation across items, responses to statement (iii) are reverse-coded so that higher values uniformly reflect more egalitarian views. Our baseline GRA index is constructed by summing responses across the four items, yielding a measure ranging from 4 to 20, with higher values indicating more egalitarian attitudes and lower values capturing more traditional norms.

In addition to gender role attitudes, we analyze assortative mating along a rich set of individual characteristics that have been shown to matter for household formation and intrahousehold outcomes: age, education, body mass index (BMI), height, self-reported health, Big Five personality traits (agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, and openness), and risk aversion. Due to the UKHLS design, some characteristics are drawn from different waves. BMI, height, and risk aversion are measured in wave 1 (2009–2011), while the Big Five personality traits are obtained from wave 3 (2011–2013).[12] All remaining variables are taken from the wave in which the couple is observed (wave 2 or wave 4).

Age is measured in years. Education is defined as the age at completion of the highest qualification ever reported by the respondent. We impute this age using standard UK educational milestones. Specifically, individuals reporting a university degree (or higher qualification) are assigned an age of 22 years, while those holding other higher degrees (e.g. a diploma in Higher Education) are assigned an age of 20 years. A-level or equivalent qualifications are assumed to be completed at age 18, GCSE or equivalent qualifications at age 16, and other (non-standard) qualifications at age 15. Individuals reporting no formal qualifications are assigned an age of 14 years. BMI is computed as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared. Height is measured in centimeters. Self-reported health is derived from the question: "In general, would you say your health is: excellent (1), very good (2), good (3), fair (4), or poor (5)?". We reverse-code this measure so that

[12]These traits are widely viewed as relatively stable over the adult life cycle, and using earlier measurements should mitigate concerns about reverse causality arising from within-couple interactions.

higher values correspond to better health.

Personality traits are measured using the 15-item short version of the Big Five Inventory (John et al., 2008). Each trait is assessed using three items rated on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = "does not apply to me at all" to 7 = "applies to me perfectly"; see Table A.1 in the Online Appendix). After reverse-coding relevant items, we compute trait scores as the average of the corresponding items, so that higher values indicate higher levels of the trait. Finally, risk aversion (risk tolerance) is measured using the question: "Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?" We use a version scaled from 1 (complete risk avoidance) to 10 (fully prepared to take risks).

Household outcomes. We examine five household-level outcomes that capture the intrahousehold allocation of time, income, and decision-making authority. First, childcare responsibilities are measured using a categorical variable indicating whether childcare is mainly performed by the respondent, mainly by the partner, or shared equally. Second, housework allocation is based on reported weekly hours spent on housework activities (e.g., cooking, cleaning, and laundry). We compute the woman's share of total housework hours and classify households as mainly female if the wife's share is between 70 and 100%, shared (30–70%), and mainly male [0–30%].

Third, labor supply is measured analogously using weekly hours of market work, from which we compute the wife's share of total market work hours and classify households into the same three categories (mainly female, shared, and mainly male). Fourth, we consider the woman's share of total household labor earnings, again categorized as mainly female, shared, or mainly male. Finally, decision-making power is captured using responses to the question on who has the final say in major financial decisions (respondent, partner, or both equally).[13]

Sample selection. Following Dupuy and Galichon (2014), we restrict the sample to heterosexual couples, exclude households in which both spouses are aged forty or older,

[13]We rely on female-reported data for childcare and financial decision-making. As shown in Appendix Table D.1, our results remain qualitatively unchanged when using partners' responses instead. For housework, market work, and labor earnings, we categorize households into three groups—mainly female, shared, or mainly male—based on 30% and 70% thresholds. Our findings are robust to using alternative thresholds (i.e., 35%/65% and 40%/60%), as reported in Appendix Table D.2.

and focus on couples in which both partners identify as white. We further exclude observations with missing information on age, education, BMI, height, gender role attitudes, or personality traits. Appendix Table A.2 shows the number of observations that remain after each selection step.[14] The final samples consists of 1,157 couples, of whom 799 are married and 358 are cohabiting.

Table 1 reports summary statistics separately for men and women. On average, women are 33 years old, approximately 2.5 years younger than their partners. They are also slightly more educated, have a BMI approximately one unit lower, and are about 15 centimeters shorter. Self-reported health is similar across genders. Women hold more egalitarian gender role attitudes and score higher on agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, and emotional stability, but lower on openness to experience and risk tolerance.

4 Main Findings

Guided by the framework developed in Section 2, we first present estimates of the affinity matrix and the associated saliency analysis, which characterize assortative matching in the marriage market. We then examine how the resulting matching dimensions are related to intrahousehold outcomes and illustrate their implications through counterfactual exercises.

4.1 Affinity Matrix

Table 2 reports the estimated affinity matrix. All attributes are standardized prior to estimation, allowing coefficients to be interpreted on a common scale and facilitating comparisons across traits.

Three main findings emerge. First, most diagonal elements of the affinity matrix are positive and statistically significant, indicating that positive assortative matching along many dimensions increases the systematic joint utility generated by a match. The largest diagonal coefficient corresponds to age (1.12), reflecting strong cohort-based sorting. Im-

[14] Several key variables, including health, personality traits, and risk aversion, exhibit substantial item non-response. To assess potential selection bias, we compare the mean age and education of the baseline sample against subsamples restricted to these additional covariates. As shown in Appendix Table A.3, means are statistically similar across subsamples, alleviating concerns regarding sample selection bias.

portantly, the next two largest coefficients are associated with gender role attitudes (0.53) and education (0.43), both statistically significant at the 1% level. Interpreted quantitatively, a one–standard deviation increase in both spouses' gender role attitudes raises joint utility by 0.53 units, compared with 0.43 units for education. Thus, assortative matching on GRA contributes roughly 20% more to joint utility than assortative matching on education, underscoring the quantitative importance of attitudinal traits in marital sorting.

We also find positive assortative matching along several additional dimensions, including BMI, height, health, openness, and risk preferences, although these effects are smaller in magnitude.

Second, several off-diagonal elements of the affinity matrix are statistically significant, revealing meaningful trade-offs across traits. For example, more educated husbands tend to match with partners who are thinner, less agreeable, and more open, while more educated wives tend to match with husbands who are healthier and less conscientious. These patterns highlight that sorting in the marriage market is inherently multidimensional and cannot be fully captured by univariate measures of homogamy.

Third, the affinity matrix is asymmetric, indicating gender differences in how partner characteristics enter joint utility. For instance, a one–standard deviation decrease in wives' BMI increases joint utility when husbands are more educated, whereas decreasing husbands' BMI has no comparable effect across wives' education levels. Such asymmetries suggest that the gains from assortative matching depend not only on the traits themselves but also on how they interact with gender-specific preferences or constraints.

4.2 Saliency Analysis

To summarize the high-dimensional structure of assortative matching, we decompose the affinity matrix into orthogonal components using the singular value decomposition given in expression (6). Table 3 reports the resulting indices. Interestingly, the five factors shown in the table account for approximately 80% of the total systematic joint utility $\Phi(x, y)$ (see the bottom row).

The first index accounts for 34% of $\Phi(x, y)$ and loads heavily on age, capturing strong sorting by birth cohort. The second factor explains an additional 17% and loads primarily on gender role attitudes; higher values of this factor correspond to more progressive norms.

The third index explains 15% of joint utility and loads mainly on education, particularly at lower levels of educational attainment. Together, these three dimensions explain 66% of total systematic joint utility. The fourth and fifth factors together account for an additional 14% of Φ, with the fourth loading primarily on BMI and the fifth capturing a combination of agreeableness and risk attitudes for men and health and risk tolerance for women.

Overall, this decomposition shows that a small number of latent indices provide a parsimonious representation of multidimensional sorting patterns, with gender role attitudes emerging as a powerful dimension alongside age and education.

4.3 Household Outcomes

Regression analysis. We next examine the relationship between the five matching dimensions identified above and our five intrahousehold outcomes. These outcomes capture three basic domains of household behavior: the division of domestic responsibilities (through childcare and housework), labor market participation (through market work and earnings), and financial decision-making power between spouses. Each outcome is coded as an ordered categorical variable indicating whether the activity is performed primarily by the female spouse, shared equally between partners, or performed primarily by the male spouse.[15]

We estimate a series of ordered probit regressions in which each household outcome is related to the five matching indices for males and females and their interactions.[16] Following Chiappori et al. (2024), we also include the expected value of match quality as a control variable to account for potential selection bias arising from the fact that we only observe couples that were actually formed.[17]

Table 4 reports average marginal effects from the estimation.[18] The results consis-

[15]The observed distribution of each partner's contribution to each of the five outcomes is shown in Figures 1–5. We discuss these figures below.

[16]We focus on the first five indices, as formal rank tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the rank of the affinity matrix is less than or equal to five (see Table B.1 in the Online Appendix). This dimensionality reduction suggests that five indices are sufficient to capture the relevant information within the matrix.

[17]Specifically, this captures the expected contribution of the unobserved shocks conditional on the match being observed and depends on the equilibrium probability that individuals with characteristics x and y match. Including this term, therefore, controls for selection into marriage based on unobserved match-specific compatibility.

[18]The coefficients from the ordered probit regressions are reported in Appendix Table B.2.

tently highlight the importance of the second matching index, which captures the gender role attitudes dimension. Higher values of this index, for both husbands and wives, are associated with less traditional household specialization. A one-standard deviation increase in the husband's index two raises the probability that childcare and housework are shared equally by 7 and 5 percentage points, respectively, and reduces the likelihood of a male-breadwinner arrangement by 7 percentage points. We find no statistically significant effect on financial decision making.

Similarly, a one-standard deviation increase in the wife's index two increases the probability of shared childcare by about 5 percentage points and reduces the probability of a male-breadwinner arrangement by 5–6 percentage points. In addition, higher values of the wife's index two are associated with more balanced decision-making power, lowering the probability that the male is the primary decision-maker by approximately 4 percentage points.

By contrast, index one, which loads on age, has limited effects on intrahousehold allocations, expect for financial decision making, where the older partner (whether male or female) tends to have greater influence.[19] The husband's education-related factor (index three) has also little impact on household outcomes, with the exception that lower-educated men are less likely to share housework. Instead, lower-educated female partners tend to perform a larger share of childcare and housework, while their spouses account for a greater share of market work and labor income.

In general, these findings underscore the central role of gender norms in shaping both assortative matching in the marriage market and the intrahousehold allocation of tasks, outweighing the comparatively modest influence of age and education.

Counterfactual simulations. To further explore how gender attitudes map into intrahousehold allocations, we use the estimated regression coefficients in the previous exercise and simulate household outcomes under a set of counterfactual scenarios. We consider three benchmark scenarios. First, in a *traditional* scenario, we decrease gender role attitudes of husbands and/or wives by one standard deviation, holding all other characteristics and complementarities fixed. Second, in a *progressive* scenario, we increase attitudes

[19] A one-standard deviation increase in this index for wives is also associated with a 5 percentage point reduction in the probability of shared housework.

by one standard deviation.[20] Third, in a *random matching* scenario, spouses are paired independently of all observed characteristics, thereby eliminating assortative matching. For each scenario, we compute the equilibrium matching implied by the estimated model and then use the regression coefficients to predict the resulting distribution of household outcomes for the simulated data.

Figures 1–5 summarize the results.[21] Predicted outcomes under the baseline specification closely match the observed distributions, lending credibility to our empirical framework. Under the traditional scenario, household specialization increases markedly. For example, in Figure 1, decreasing either spouse's GRA by one standard deviation increases the share of households in which the wife is the primary childcare provider by approximately 6 percentage points, while decreasing both spouses' attitudes raises this share by 14 percentage points. Conversely, under the progressive scenario, the fraction of households with shared childcare increases by 6 points when either spouse becomes more progressive and by about 10 points when both do.

Random matching produces strikingly different outcomes: the share of households in which the male is the primary childcare provider rises to 11.4%, compared with 2.9% in the observed data. This counterfactual underscores the importance of positive assortative matching in shaping specialization patterns in marriage (for related evidence on the role of random matching in mate choice decisions, see Belot and Francesconi, 2013).

Similar patterns emerge for housework. Figure 2 shows that, when only husbands or only wives become more traditional, the share of couples in which the female is primarily responsible for housework increases by 8.5 and 3.4 percentage points, respectively. This share increases by 11.5 points when both partners become more traditional. In contrast, under the progressive counterfactual, the fraction of couples who share housework increases by 5.4, 2.1, and 7.3 percentage points when only husbands, only wives, and both spouses become more progressive, respectively. Relative to childcare, the division of housework is more sensitive to husbands' GRA: having a more progressive husband is

[20] In Appendix Figures D.1–D.5, we present counterfactual outcomes following a two-standard-deviation shift in attitudes. Our primary findings remain unchanged under these alternative counterfactual scenarios.

[21] The figures show bar charts of the fraction of couples in which each household outcome is primarily the male's responsibility, shared, or primarily the female's responsibility. Each figure contains nine bars: the observed distribution in the data (which we referred to at the start of subsection 4.3); the distribution predicted by the estimated model; three *traditional* counterfactuals, in which only males, only females, or both partners are made more traditional; three corresponding *progressive* counterfactuals; and a final counterfactual based on pure *random matching*.

associated with substantially greater sharing of housework, whereas the marginal effect of a more progressive wife is comparatively modest.[22,23]

Figures 3 and 4 report the distributions of labor supply and market earnings. For both outcomes, household behavior shifts toward a male breadwinner model when either husbands or wives become more traditional. In these cases, the proportion of couples in which the male is the primary market labor supplier increases by 6 and 8.3 percentage points, respectively, and by 17 points when both partners become more traditional. We observe closely similar patterns for labor income. Under the progressive counterfactuals, the prevalence of the male breadwinner norm instead declines by approximately 5–10 percentage points, depending on which partner's attitudes shift.

Finally, Figure 5 presents the distribution of decision-making authority within households. In the observed sample, major financial decisions are jointly made in 57% of couples; in 23.2% of couples, the female has primary decision-making authority, while in 19.7% the male does. Counterfactual changes in husbands' GRA have little effect on this margin. However, shifts in wives' attitudes matter: making wives more traditional reallocates decision-making power toward husbands by about 3 percentage points, while making them more progressive increases the share of female-led decision-making by 4.3 points.

In sum, across all counterfactuals, progressive attitudes are strongly associated with more equal sharing of crucial household decisions, whereas traditional attitudes increase specialization and the prevalence of male-breadwinner arrangements.

[22]The data also allow us to observe the division of domestic responsibilities across specific housework dimensions: grocery shopping, cooking, cleaning, laundry, gardening, and DIY tasks. For each task, respondents indicate whether it is performed mainly by themselves, mainly by their partner, or shared. Based on the female's reports, we classify households into three categories (mainly female, shared, or mainly male). Appendix Table B.3 reports average marginal effects from ordered probit regressions, relating each housework dimension to the five matching indices and their interactions. Consistent with our aggregate housework measure, we find that higher values of index two for both spouses are associated with a shift away from traditional specialization in shopping, cooking, cleaning, and laundry. We find no statistically significant effects for gardening or DIY jobs. Figures B.1–B.6 present predicted outcomes under counterfactual scenarios. Except for gardening and DIY, households exhibit greater specialization when spouses are more traditional and a more egalitarian division of labor when they are more progressive.

[23]Interestingly, Figure 2 also shows that, under random matching, the fraction of households in which women perform a larger share of housework increases from 47.8% to 55.4%. Additional evidence (not reported for space concerns, but available upon request) suggests that this pattern may be driven by age effects: older female partners in fact are more likely to undertake housework, even after controlling for education and gender role attitudes.

5 Post-marital Convergence

In our benchmark analysis, we use individuals' *observed* gender role attitudes, which are measured only after marriage. If spouses' attitudes converge over the course of marriage, estimates of assortative matching, particularly the diagonal elements of the affinity matrix, may be upward biased. Existing evidence suggests that gender role attitudes evolve over the life cycle, especially following marriage and childbearing (e.g., Berrington et al., 2008; Schober and Scott, 2012; Baxter et al., 2015). We therefore conduct a set of sensitivity exercises to assess the extent to which post-match convergence contributes to our estimated degree of assortative matching.

Marriage and childbearing. We first examine whether assortative matching in GRA differs across relationship types and family structures. If post-marital convergence is important, assortativeness should be stronger among married couples than among cohabiting couples, and weaker among couples without children.

When we restrict the sample to legally married couples, excluding cohabiting pairs, the estimated affinity matrix remains largely unchanged. In particular, assortativeness in GRA increases only modestly, from 0.53 in the benchmark sample to 0.56 (see the results in Appendix Table C.1). By contrast, when we restrict the sample to couples without children, assortativeness in GRA declines substantially, to 0.32 (see Appendix Table C.2). This pattern suggests that post-match convergence in gender role attitudes is more closely associated with childbearing than with marriage per se. Accordingly, the assortativeness estimated from the benchmark affinity matrix in Table 2 should be interpreted as an upper bound, reflecting both pre-marital sorting on gender role attitudes and potential post-marital convergence driven by shared environments, life events, or endogenous attitudinal adjustments.

Predicted gender role attitudes. To further assess the extent to which post-match convergence contributes to the estimated assortativeness, we construct a new measure of *predicted* GRA based on a set of predetermined background characteristics. Specifically, for each gender, we regress observed GRA on own education, parents' country of birth interacted with their education, parental employment status and occupation (from the one-digit level Standard Occupational Classification) interacted with their education, in-

dividual birth cohort and an indicator for being born in the UK, both interacted with own education, religion, whether the individual lived with biological parents at age 16, and immigration generation status (defined by the number of generations the family has resided in the UK). We then use the fitted values from such regressions to predict individuals' GRA and re-estimate the affinity matrix using these predicted attitudes. By construction, predicted GRA capture only the component of gender role attitudes explained by predetermined background characteristics and excludes variation arising from individual-specific experiences, endogenous life-cycle adjustments, or ex post rationalization within marriage.

Because predicted GRA does not capture partner selection on attitudes beyond what is implied by background characteristics, assortativeness estimated using predicted GRA is expected to be attenuated relative to true assortative matching. Consequently, assortativeness based on predicted GRA can be interpreted as a lower bound on sorting in gender role attitudes, while estimates based on observed GRA constitute an upper bound. Table 5 reports the estimated affinity matrix based on predicted GRA. Using predicted GRA, we continue to find a positive and economically meaningful degree of assortative matching. The diagonal coefficient in the affinity matrix is 0.18 and remains statistically significant at 1% level, indicating that the benchmark results are not driven solely by post-marital convergence in spouses' attitudes.

Implications for household outcomes. Finally, we assess whether reverse causality affects our analysis of household outcomes. If gender role attitudes evolve in response to household decisions, regressions of intrahousehold allocations on observed attitudes may partly reflect feedback effects. We therefore relate household outcomes to both predicted and observed GRA. As shown in Appendix Table C.3, the estimated associations are comparable, and in some cases larger, when using predicted GRA. Because predicted attitudes are constructed from predetermined characteristics and are not subject to feedback from household outcomes, this evidence suggests that reverse causality is unlikely to be a primary driver of our results. This alleviates concerns about reverse causality in our analysis of intrahousehold allocations, where the matching indices place substantial weight on spouses' gender role attitudes.

6 Sensitivity Checks

Secular trends. Positive assortative matching across the traits could be partially driven by secular trends. For instance, if younger cohorts are systematically more educated or hold more progressive attitudes, the diagonal elements of the affinity matrix would be mechanically positive. To address this, we estimate an alternative specification using detrended attributes. Specifically, we regress each trait (excluding age) on birth year fixed effects and use the resulting residuals for estimation. The results, reported in Appendix Table C.4, remain qualitatively similar to our primary specification, suggesting that secular trends do not drive the observed sorting patterns.

Extended GRA measure. As a sensitivity check, we also construct an extended GRA measure that incorporates agreement with an additional statement, (v) "Employers should help mothers combine paid work and childcare", which captures support for institutional arrangements facilitating maternal employment. This item is reverse-coded to preserve comparability with the baseline index. Results from this check are reported in Appendix Table C.5. Our conclusion remains robust to the inclusion of this additional dimension.

Ethnicity. Our baseline specification restricts the sample to white couples. To assess whether assortative matching on GRA persists in the full population, we re-estimate the model including all ethnic groups and explicitly account for ethnic sorting using two alternative approaches. First, following Ciscato et al. (2020), we include an indicator variable for whether spouses share the same ethnic background, thereby controlling directly for ethnic homogamy (Appendix Table C.6). Second, we employ an ordinal measure of ethnic distance from the white majority population, taking the value 1 for white couples, 2 for mixed (white/non-white) ethnicity couples, and 3 for couples in which both spouses have non-white backgrounds (Appendix Table C.7). This specification allows ethnic similarity to enter the affinity matrix as an additional sorting dimension.

Both approaches confirm substantial ethnic homogamy. Importantly, however, accounting for ethnicity leaves our primary conclusions regarding GRA unchanged. Assortative matching on gender role attitudes remains economically large and statistically significant; if anything, the corresponding coefficient increases modestly, from 0.53 in the baseline sample to 0.59 and 0.57 under the two alternative specifications. For comparison,

the education affinity coefficient rises by a similar magnitude. These results indicate that sorting on gender role attitudes is not an artifact of ethnic homogamy and persists even when ethnic similarity is modeled explicitly.

7 Conclusions

This paper establishes gender role attitudes as a central determinant of equilibrium outcomes in the marriage market and a key mechanism linking cultural beliefs to gender inequality within households. By embedding attitudes in a structural, multidimensional matching framework, we show that beliefs about gender are not secondary preferences, but fundamental traits that shape who marries whom and how partners subsequently allocate labor, resources, and authority within their households.

Our first contribution is to demonstrate that assortative matching on gender role attitudes is quantitatively large and comparable in importance to canonical sorting dimensions such as education. Although prior work has emphasized socioeconomic characteristics as the primary sources of marital complementarity, we find that similarity in gender role attitudes generates joint marital surplus at least as large as educational homogamy. A one–standard deviation increase in both spouses' attitudes raises joint utility by approximately 20% more than an equivalent increase in education. This result suggests that cultural homogamy regarding gender norms is not merely a residual outcome of sorting on observables but a primary complementarity that individuals seek to maximize when choosing a partner.

Second, we demonstrate that sorting on gender role attitudes has profound consequences for gender inequality within the household. The matching dimension associated with gender norms strongly predicts how partners contribute to childcare, housework, market work, household labor income, and decision-making authority. Couples matched on progressive attitudes are substantially more likely to share domestic responsibilities and deviate from traditional male-breadwinner arrangements, while assortative matching among traditional individuals amplifies specialization and entrenches female domestic burdens. Counterfactual simulations reveal that marital sorting itself is a key propagation mechanism: even holding the distribution of attitudes fixed, assortative matching generates markedly more unequal household outcomes than random matching. In this

sense, inequality is not only a matter of individual beliefs, but also of how those beliefs are paired in equilibrium.

Third, we provide compelling evidence that these patterns are not driven by post-marital convergence in attitudes. Using predicted gender role attitudes based exclusively on predetermined family background characteristics observed before marriage, we show that assortative matching remains strong and that the association between attitudes and household outcomes persists. Interestingly, predetermined attitudes predict intrahousehold allocations at least as strongly as observed post-marital attitudes, indicating that the beliefs individuals bring into marriage, rather than those shaped by marriage, are the primary drivers of household behavior.

Taken together, our findings imply that gender role attitudes are economically consequential traits that shape both who marries whom and how inequality unfolds within households. The marriage market emerges as a critical channel through which cultural norms are translated into persistent gender disparities. More broadly, our results suggest that policies or social changes that affect gender role norms — such as educational curricula, parental leave and childcare designs, or workplace policies, e.g., hiring practices, flexible hours, incentives and feedback — may have long-lasting effects through marital sorting, with implications for labor supply, household specialization, and gender equality.

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Figures

Figure 1: Contribution to Childcare



Notes: The outcome variable is based on the survey question, 'Who is mainly responsible for looking after the children?' and is categorized as: (1) mainly self, (2) both, or (3) mainly partner.

Figure 2: Contribution to Housework



Notes: Housework categories are defined by the wife's share of total weekly housework hours: mainly wife (70–100%), shared (30–70%), and mainly husband (0–30%).

Figure 3: Contribution to Market Work



Notes: Market work is defined as the sum of weekly work hours and daily commuting time. Household categories are based on the wife's share of total couple market work: mainly wife (70–100%), shared (30–70%), and mainly husband (0–30%).

Figure 4: Contribution to Labor Income



Notes: The outcome variable is based on total net personal income (net of taxes and national insurance). Household categories are defined by the wife's share of total couple income: mainly wife (70–100%), shared (30–70%), and mainly husband (0–30%).

Figure 5: Contribution to Financial Decisions



Notes: The outcome variable is based on the survey question, 'In your household, who has the final say in big financial decisions?' and is categorized as: (1) mainly self, (2) both, or (3) mainly partner.

Tables

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Male		Female	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Age	35.60	6.40	33.17	5.67
Education	18.80	2.58	19.31	2.59
BMI	26.64	4.17	25.78	5.34
Height	179.68	7.23	164.79	6.95
Health	3.75	0.83	3.80	0.89
GRA	13.93	2.94	14.36	2.99
Agreeableness	5.32	1.03	5.71	0.96
Conscientiousness	5.46	1.00	5.67	0.97
Extraversion	4.52	1.23	4.80	1.24
Neuroticism	3.29	1.33	4.04	1.35
Openness	4.77	1.13	4.55	1.21
Risk Aversion	6.18	2.28	5.06	2.30

Table 2: Affinity Matrix: Marital Sorting Coefficients

	Female											
Male	Age	Edu.	BMI	Height	Health	GRA	Agree.	Consc.	Extra.	Neuro.	Open.	Risk
Age	**1.12**	−0.08	0.00	**0.10**	**0.09**	−0.04	−0.06	0.08	**−0.08**	0.02	−0.00	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Education	0.13	**0.43**	**−0.07**	0.04	0.06	−0.03	**−0.11**	−0.04	−0.01	0.01	**0.13**	−0.01
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
BMI	0.04	−0.00	**0.21**	0.01	−0.00	0.06	0.05	−0.00	−0.01	0.01	−0.06	−0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Height	0.01	0.06	0.05	**0.15**	−0.06	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.02	−0.02	0.01	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Health	0.07	**0.08**	**−0.09**	−0.04	**0.10**	−0.05	0.04	−0.01	0.04	−0.00	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
GRA	−0.01	0.05	0.04	−0.02	0.04	**0.53**	0.02	−0.05	0.01	−0.01	**−0.08**	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Agreeableness	−0.06	0.01	**0.08**	−0.02	**0.08**	0.02	0.01	0.03	−0.02	0.05	**0.07**	−0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Conscientious.	0.01	**−0.11**	0.04	0.01	−0.04	0.02	**0.07**	0.00	0.04	**−0.09**	**−0.09**	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Extraversion	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	0.01	0.03	−0.01	0.02	0.03	−0.00	0.01	0.03	−0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Neuroticism	−0.00	0.04	0.01	−0.01	−0.06	0.01	**0.10**	−0.06	**−0.08**	−0.04	−0.03	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Openness	0.06	0.05	**−0.07**	0.00	0.02	−0.03	−0.04	−0.03	0.02	0.05	**0.11**	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Risk Aversion	−0.06	0.03	−0.05	0.01	−0.04	−0.01	0.00	0.05	−0.01	0.05	−0.03	**0.13**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Diagonal elements (shaded) represent homogamy coefficients. A lighter shading is used to distinguish variable blocks by row. Alternate row pairs are shaded to assist readability. Significant estimates ($p < 0.05$) in bold. Each matching variables is standardized and scaled such that higher values correspond to higher levels of the trait.

Table 3: Saliency Analysis

	Male					Female				
	Index 1 Age	Index 2 GRA	Index 3 Education	Index 4 BMI	Index 5 Agreeableness Risk	Index 1 Age	Index 2 GRA	Index 3 Education	Index 4 BMI	Index 5 Health Risk
Age	**0.99**	**0.09**	**0.09**	0.02	0.00	**0.98**	**0.06**	−0.01	−0.00	0.03
	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Education	**0.12**	**−0.34**	**−0.82**	**−0.24**	0.05	−0.02	**−0.25**	**−0.83**	**−0.33**	**0.13**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.05)
BMI	0.02	**0.22**	**0.07**	**−0.68**	**−0.30**	−0.01	**0.24**	**0.16**	**−0.79**	**−0.40**
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Height	0.01	**0.08**	**−0.11**	**−0.42**	**0.34**	**0.09**	−0.01	−0.04	**−0.32**	**0.29**
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Health	**0.06**	**−0.12**	**−0.13**	**0.27**	−0.08	**0.09**	−0.01	**−0.16**	**0.25**	**−0.54**
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.08)
GRA	**−0.04**	**0.86**	**−0.44**	**0.24**	−0.02	**−0.06**	**0.87**	**−0.38**	**0.17**	−0.05
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Agreeableness	−0.05	0.00	−0.05	−0.15	**−0.57**	**−0.07**	**0.13**	**0.18**	**−0.18**	0.12
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Conscientiousness	−0.00	**0.18**	**0.25**	−0.11	**0.27**	**0.06**	−0.04	**0.13**	0.02	−0.07
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Extraversion	−0.02	−0.02	0.02	0.07	−0.11	**−0.07**	−0.01	−0.01	0.13	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Neuroticism	−0.02	0.05	−0.01	**−0.26**	**0.39**	0.02	−0.06	−0.06	0.11	**−0.24**
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Openness	**0.05**	**−0.15**	**−0.16**	**0.24**	−0.03	0.02	**−0.27**	**−0.23**	0.05	**−0.30**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Risk Aversion	−0.05	−0.03	−0.02	0.09	**0.48**	0.01	**0.10**	−0.03	0.07	**0.53**
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Index Share	**0.34**	**0.17**	**0.15**	**0.07**	**0.07**	**0.34**	**0.17**	**0.15**	**0.07**	**0.07**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)

Notes: Variables listed at the top of each column are those with saliency weights of about 0.5 or above for the corresponding index. Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates significant at the 5% level are in bold. All variables are standardized. Shading is used to distinguish variable blocks.

Table 4: Average Marginal Effects

	Childcare		Housework		Market Work		Labor Income		Financial Decisions	
	p(shared)	p(male)	p(shared)	p(male)	p(shared)	p(male)	p(shared)	p(male)	p(shared)	p(male)
Index 1 (male)	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.00	−0.01	−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03
	[0.09]	[0.37]	[0.11]	[0.20]	[0.70]	[0.65]	[0.96]	[0.96]	[0.91]	[0.05]
Index 2 (male)	0.07	0.01	0.05	0.02	0.03	−0.07	0.05	−0.07	−0.00	−0.02
	[0.00]	[0.35]	[0.00]	[0.12]	[0.24]	[0.00]	[0.03]	[0.00]	[0.69]	[0.20]
Index 3 (male)	0.01	0.00	−0.03	−0.01	−0.01	−0.00	−0.01	−0.00	−0.00	−0.03
	[0.67]	[0.55]	[0.03]	[0.18]	[0.21]	[0.91]	[0.59]	[1.00]	[0.86]	[0.03]
Index 4 (male)	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	−0.01	0.01	−0.02	0.00	−0.01
	[0.11]	[0.40]	[0.32]	[0.39]	[0.68]	[0.45]	[0.28]	[0.22]	[1.00]	[0.24]
Index 5 (male)	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	−0.03	0.01	−0.01	0.00	0.00
	[0.57]	[0.61]	[0.39]	[0.42]	[0.37]	[0.03]	[0.43]	[0.37]	[0.98]	[0.82]
Index 1 (female)	−0.01	−0.00	−0.05	−0.02	0.00	−0.00	0.01	−0.01	−0.00	−0.03
	[0.81]	[0.72]	[0.01]	[0.13]	[0.81]	[0.75]	[0.53]	[0.50]	[0.87]	[0.03]
Index 2 (female)	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.03	−0.06	0.04	−0.05	−0.01	−0.04
	[0.00]	[0.40]	[0.51]	[0.53]	[0.22]	[0.00]	[0.03]	[0.00]	[0.80]	[0.02]
Index 3 (female)	−0.03	−0.01	−0.04	−0.01	−0.03	0.07	−0.08	0.11	−0.00	0.02
	[0.03]	[0.36]	[0.01]	[0.16]	[0.28]	[0.00]	[0.01]	[0.00]	[0.93]	[0.07]
Index 4 (female)	0.01	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	0.01	−0.02	0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.01
	[0.53]	[0.65]	[0.67]	[0.69]	[0.49]	[0.13]	[0.75]	[0.75]	[0.93]	[0.33]
Index 5 (female)	−0.00	−0.00	−0.01	−0.00	0.01	−0.02	0.00	−0.01	−0.00	−0.01
	[0.91]	[0.92]	[0.32]	[0.38]	[0.39]	[0.08]	[0.61]	[0.59]	[0.88]	[0.36]
Exp. Match Quality	−0.01	−0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.01	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	[0.23]	[0.00]	[0.54]	[0.68]	[0.65]	[0.44]	[0.91]	[0.90]	[0.91]	[0.70]

Notes: Table reports average marginal effects from ordered probit regressions. The dependent variable categories are (1) mainly female, (2) shared, and (3) mainly male. Effects for 'mainly female' are omitted for brevity, as marginal effects across all categories sum to zero. *P*-values are in parentheses.

Table 5: Affinity Matrix; Using Predicted GRA

	Female											
Male	Age	Edu.	BMI	Height	Health	P. GRA	Agree.	Consc.	Extra.	Neuro.	Open.	Risk
Age	**1.24**	−0.10	−0.03	**0.11**	0.02	0.09	−0.05	**0.13**	−0.07	−0.02	−0.05	−0.01
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Education	**0.13**	**0.45**	−0.04	0.00	**0.09**	**−0.10**	**−0.15**	−0.04	−0.05	−0.01	**0.18**	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
BMI	0.06	−0.04	**0.19**	0.04	0.02	0.07	0.06	−0.01	0.04	0.03	−0.05	−0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Height	−0.01	0.03	0.02	**0.13**	−0.05	0.06	0.02	0.01	0.03	−0.03	0.02	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Health	0.05	**0.10**	**−0.09**	−0.04	**0.11**	0.00	**0.10**	−0.02	0.05	0.03	−0.01	−0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Predicted GRA	−0.10	−0.04	−0.02	0.00	0.01	**0.18**	0.07	−0.00	0.07	0.02	−0.06	−0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Agreeableness	−0.02	−0.02	0.07	0.02	0.07	0.07	0.02	0.04	−0.01	0.08	0.03	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Conscientiousness	0.03	**−0.11**	0.06	0.06	−0.06	−0.01	0.06	−0.00	0.01	**−0.10**	−0.06	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Extraversion	−0.06	−0.02	−0.03	−0.02	−0.01	−0.01	−0.02	0.04	−0.02	−0.04	0.01	−0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Neuroticism	−0.07	0.03	0.03	0.00	−0.04	−0.01	**0.11**	−0.07	**−0.10**	−0.04	−0.04	**0.09**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Openness	0.04	0.06	−0.06	−0.05	0.04	0.00	−0.07	0.00	0.00	0.06	**0.14**	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Risk Aversion	−0.02	0.03	−0.05	0.00	−0.03	0.02	0.00	0.04	−0.01	0.06	**−0.09**	**0.16**
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)

Notes: $N = 799$. Diagonal elements (shaded) represent homogamy coefficients. A lighter shading is used to distinguish variable blocks by row. Alternate row pairs are shaded to assist readability. Significant estimates ($p < 0.05$) in bold. All matching variables are scaled by their standard deviation.

Online Appendix

A Data

Table A.1: Big Five Personality Traits in the UK Household Longitudinal Study

Big 5 Personality Trait	Survey items/statements I see myself as someone who ...
Openness to Experience	(i) is original, comes up with new ideas; (ii) values artistic, aesthetic experiences; (iii) has an active imagination.
Conscientiousness	(i) does a thorough job; (ii) tends to be lazy (reverse coded); (iii) does things efficiently.
Extraversion	(i) is talkative; (ii) is outgoing, sociable; (iii) is reserved (reverse coded).
Agreeableness	(i) is sometimes rude to others (reverse coded); (ii) has a forgiving nature; (iii) is considerate and kind to almost everyone.
Neuroticism	(i) worries a lot; (ii) gets nervous easily; (iii) is relaxed, handles stress well (reverse coded).

Notes: Respondents rate each statement on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (does not apply to me at all) to 7 (applies to me perfectly). Each trait score is constructed by summing responses to the three corresponding items after reverse coding where indicated.

Table A.2: Sample Selection

	Sample size	Dropped
	5,025	
Age/Birth Year	5,019	6
Education	4,985	34
Health	3,995	990
Personality Traits	2,796	1,199
Risk Aversion	1,447	1,349
BMI/Height	1,318	129
GRA	1,302	16
Household Outcomes	1,157	145

Table A.3: Sample Selection and Attrition

	Sample	Age		Education	
Information on	Size	Male	Female	Male	Female
Age and Education	4,985	34.59	32.18	18.34	18.76
		(7.13)	(6.39)	(2.63)	(2.65)
Age, Education and Health	3,995	34.51	32.07	18.35	18.81
		(7.20)	(6.41)	(2.62)	(2.65)
Age, Education and Personality Traits	3,180	35.08	32.58	18.46	18.91
		(6.93)	(6.12)	(2.62)	(2.64)
Age, Education and Risk Aversion	2,205	35.50	33.03	18.48	18.92
		(6.66)	(5.91)	(2.66)	(2.66)
Age, Education, BMI and Height	2,250	35.61	33.17	18.49	18.94
		(6.61)	(5.88)	(2.66)	(2.67)
Age, Education and GRA	3,929	34.49	32.08	18.36	18.82
		(7.20)	(6.41)	(2.62)	(2.65)
Age, Education and Household Outcomes	3,766	34.64	32.33	18.54	19.00
		(6.87)	(6.27)	(2.61)	(2.59)
Final Sample	1,157	35.60	33.17	18.80	19.31
		(6.40)	(5.67)	(2.58)	(2.59)

Notes: Table reports sample attrition due to missing information. Starting from 4,985 couples with complete age and education data, the table tracks the remaining observations after filtering for missing data. Age and education summary statistics are reported for each subsample to verify consistency across selection criteria.

B Additional Results

Table B.1: Rank Test

H_0: $rk(A) = k$	$k = 1$	$k = 2$	$k = 3$	$k = 4$	$k = 5$	$k = 6$	$k = 7$	$k = 8$	$k = 9$	$k = 10$	$k = 11$
χ^2	603.87	409.97	180.22	122.08	82.55	52.44	39.08	19.16	6.19	2.52	0.08
df	121	100	81	64	49	36	25	16	9	4	1
P-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.04	0.26	0.72	0.64	0.78

Notes: The table reports statistics from a series of tests in which the null hypothesis is that the rank of the estimated affinity matrix is equal to $k = \{1, \ldots, 11\}$. We reject the null hypothesis that $k = 5$ at the 1% level, suggesting that sorting occurs along at least five orthogonal dimensions.

Figure B.1: Contribution to Grocery Shopping



Notes: The outcome variable is based on the survey question, 'Could you please say who does grocery shopping in your household?' and is categorized as: (1) mainly self, (2) both, or (3) mainly partner.

Table B.2: Regressing Household Outcomes on Matching Indices

	Childcare	Housework	Market Work	Labor Income	Financial Decisions
Index 1 (male)	0.11	0.08	−0.02	0.00	0.10
	[0.07]	[0.09]	[0.64]	[0.96]	[0.03]
Index 2 (male)	0.22	0.20	−0.20	−0.21	−0.06
	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.10]
Index 3 (male)	0.03	−0.11	−0.02	−0.01	−0.11
	[0.48]	[0.00]	[0.62]	[0.84]	[0.00]
Index 4 (male)	0.07	0.04	−0.03	−0.05	−0.04
	[0.12]	[0.31]	[0.43]	[0.22]	[0.24]
Index 5 (male)	0.03	0.03	−0.09	−0.04	0.01
	[0.57]	[0.37]	[0.02]	[0.36]	[0.83]
Index 1 (female)	−0.01	−0.19	−0.02	−0.03	−0.13
	[0.93]	[0.00]	[0.74]	[0.50]	[0.01]
Index 2 (female)	0.18	0.03	−0.17	−0.16	−0.14
	[0.00]	[0.48]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]
Index 3 (female)	−0.09	−0.14	0.22	0.33	0.06
	[0.05]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.08]
Index 4 (female)	0.03	−0.02	−0.06	−0.01	0.04
	[0.56]	[0.67]	[0.11]	[0.75]	[0.32]
Index 5 (female)	−0.01	−0.04	−0.07	−0.02	−0.04
	[0.90]	[0.30]	[0.06]	[0.58]	[0.35]
Index 1 (male)*Index 1 (female)	−0.07	0.02	0.07	0.02	−0.04
	[0.27]	[0.73]	[0.16]	[0.68]	[0.34]
Index 2 (male)*Index 2 (female)	−0.08	0.00	0.09	0.05	−0.04
	[0.12]	[0.91]	[0.04]	[0.26]	[0.31]
Index 3 (male)*Index 3 (female)	−0.06	0.02	0.10	0.07	−0.05
	[0.20]	[0.67]	[0.00]	[0.06]	[0.13]
Index 4 (male)*Index 4 (female)	−0.04	0.00	−0.04	−0.01	−0.06
	[0.40]	[0.96]	[0.31]	[0.88]	[0.07]
Index 5 (male)*Index 5 (female)	−0.04	−0.01	0.03	−0.02	−0.02
	[0.48]	[0.82]	[0.53]	[0.56]	[0.69]
Exp. Match Quality	−0.05	0.01	0.02	0.00	−0.01
	[0.20]	[0.59]	[0.37]	[0.90]	[0.73]
N	797	1157	1157	1157	1157

Notes: Table reports coefficients from ordered probit models with P-values in parentheses. The dependent variable is categorical: (1) mainly female, (2) shared, and (3) mainly male.

Table B.3: Average Marginal Effects; Specific Dimensions of Housework

	Grocery Shopping		Cooking		Cleaning		Washing		Gardening		DIY Jobs	
	p(shared)	p(male)	p(shared)	p(male)	p(shared)	p(male)	p(shared)	p(male)	p(shared)	p(male)	p(shared)	p(male)
Index 1 (male)	0.01	0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02	−0.00	0.01	0.01	−0.01
	[0.29]	[0.58]	[0.95]	[0.67]	[0.09]	[0.15]	[0.01]	[0.10]	[0.71]	[0.58]	[0.48]	[0.47]
Index 2 (male)	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	−0.00	0.00	0.01	−0.02
	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.08]	[0.02]	[0.00]	[0.10]	[0.00]	[0.15]	[0.88]	[0.90]	[0.26]	[0.28]
Index 3 (male)	−0.01	−0.01	−0.00	−0.01	0.00	−0.00	−0.02	−0.02	−0.01	0.03	−0.01	0.02
	[0.42]	[0.26]	[0.60]	[0.22]	[0.87]	[0.98]	[0.00]	[0.19]	[0.30]	[0.04]	[0.23]	[0.25]
Index 4 (male)	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	−0.01	0.03	−0.01	0.01
	[0.24]	[0.26]	[0.17]	[0.09]	[0.06]	[0.16]	[0.02]	[0.19]	[0.31]	[0.07]	[0.29]	[0.30]
Index 5 (male)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.01	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	0.01	−0.00	0.01
	[0.91]	[0.91]	[0.54]	[0.51]	[0.04]	[0.15]	[0.75]	[0.74]	[0.41]	[0.36]	[0.53]	[0.62]
Index 1 (female)	−0.03	−0.03	−0.00	−0.01	−0.04	−0.03	−0.04	−0.03	0.02	−0.06	0.00	−0.01
	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.83]	[0.51]	[0.00]	[0.10]	[0.00]	[0.12]	[0.24]	[0.00]	[0.77]	[0.75]
Index 2 (female)	−0.00	−0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	−0.01	0.04	−0.00	0.00
	[0.77]	[0.97]	[0.13]	[0.07]	[0.05]	[0.15]	[0.34]	[0.49]	[0.25]	[0.02]	[0.92]	[0.92]
Index 3 (female)	−0.01	−0.01	−0.02	−0.04	−0.02	−0.01	−0.02	−0.02	−0.00	0.01	0.01	−0.01
	[0.31]	[0.22]	[0.12]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.16]	[0.00]	[0.20]	[0.73]	[0.61]	[0.27]	[0.27]
Index 4 (female)	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.01	0.00	−0.00	−0.01	0.01
	[0.93]	[0.87]	[0.84]	[0.89]	[0.02]	[0.14]	[0.03]	[0.20]	[0.78]	[0.88]	[0.32]	[0.34]
Index 5 (female)	−0.00	−0.00	−0.01	−0.02	−0.01	−0.00	−0.01	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.01	−0.02
	[0.92]	[0.93]	[0.17]	[0.11]	[0.48]	[0.66]	[0.50]	[0.51]	[0.69]	[0.78]	[0.12]	[0.15]
Exp. Match Quality	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00
	[0.00]	[0.24]	[0.10]	[0.49]	[0.25]	[0.52]	[0.63]	[0.49]	[0.91]	[0.91]	[0.72]	[0.75]

Notes: Table reports average marginal effects from ordered probit regressions. The dependent variable categories are (1) mainly female, (2) shared, and (3) mainly male. Effects for 'mainly female' are omitted for brevity, as marginal effects across all categories sum to zero. *P*-values are in parentheses.

Figure B.2: Contribution to Cooking



Notes: The outcome variable is based on the survey question, 'Who does the cooking?' and is categorized as: (1) mainly self, (2) both, or (3) mainly partner.

Figure B.3: Contribution to Cleaning



Notes: The outcome variable is based on the survey question, 'Who does the cleaning/hoovering?' and is categorized as: (1) mainly self, (2) both, or (3) mainly partner.

Figure B.4: Contribution to Washing



Notes: The outcome variable is based on the survey question, 'Who does the washing and ironing?' and is categorized as: (1) mainly self, (2) both, or (3) mainly partner.

Figure B.5: Contribution to Gardening



Notes: The outcome variable is based on the survey question, 'Who does the gardening?' and is categorized as: (1) mainly self, (2) both, or (3) mainly partner.

Figure B.6: Contribution to DIY Jobs



Notes: The outcome variable is based on the survey question, 'Who does the DIY jobs?' and is categorized as: (1) mainly self, (2) both, or (3) mainly partner.

C Sensitivity Checks

Table C.1: Affinity Matrix; Married Couples

	Female											
Male	Age	Education	BMI	Height	Health	GRA	Agreeableness	Conscientiousness	Extraversion	Neuroticism	Openness	Risk Aversion
Age	**1.03**	**−0.12**	−0.01	0.06	**0.12**	0.02	−0.01	0.09	**−0.12**	−0.01	0.03	0.04
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education	**0.12**	**0.42**	**−0.11**	0.03	0.08	−0.03	**−0.13**	−0.02	0.02	0.04	**0.13**	−0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
BMI	0.03	−0.02	**0.19**	0.02	−0.01	0.04	0.08	0.03	−0.01	0.03	**−0.10**	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Height	−0.00	0.04	0.03	**0.15**	−0.07	0.06	0.06	0.01	0.02	−0.05	−0.04	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Health	**0.11**	**0.09**	−0.05	−0.08	**0.11**	−0.01	0.07	−0.03	0.04	0.01	0.02	−0.03
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
GRA	0.02	0.04	0.05	−0.01	0.04	**0.56**	0.01	−0.04	0.03	0.02	**−0.10**	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Agreeableness	−0.05	0.02	**0.12**	−0.03	0.05	−0.01	0.04	0.04	−0.07	0.02	0.06	−0.03
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Conscientiousness	0.01	−0.08	0.03	−0.03	−0.04	−0.01	0.06	−0.01	0.02	**−0.13**	−0.06	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Extraversion	−0.08	−0.06	−0.06	−0.02	−0.03	0.04	0.02	0.02	−0.01	−0.04	0.03	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Neuroticism	−0.03	0.03	0.02	−0.02	−0.08	−0.02	**0.10**	−0.04	**−0.12**	**−0.10**	−0.05	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Openness	0.09	0.02	−0.08	0.02	0.03	−0.02	−0.06	−0.02	0.01	**0.09**	**0.09**	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Risk Aversion	−0.02	0.02	−0.05	0.03	−0.02	−0.04	−0.00	0.07	−0.02	0.07	−0.03	**0.16**
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)

Notes: $N = 799$. Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates that are significant at below 5% level are printed in bold. All matching variables are scaled by their standard deviation.

Table C.2: Affinity Matrix; Childless Couples

	Female											
Male	Age	Education	BMI	Height	Health	GRA	Agreeableness	Conscientiousness	Extraversion	Neuroticism	Openness	Risk Aversion
Age	**1.00**	0.05	−0.07	**0.18**	0.07	−0.12	**−0.21**	0.01	−0.12	0.05	−0.09	−0.03
	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Education	0.08	**0.40**	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.00	−0.02	−0.06	−0.07	−0.01	**0.14**	0.01
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
BMI	0.07	−0.03	**0.18**	−0.07	0.01	0.05	−0.01	0.02	0.06	**0.14**	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Height	−0.07	**0.14**	0.02	**0.17**	0.01	−0.03	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.03	0.05	0.04
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Health	0.09	0.09	**−0.17**	−0.09	0.08	−0.03	0.00	−0.04	0.07	0.09	−0.06	0.00
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
GRA	−0.11	0.02	−0.03	−0.02	0.10	**0.32**	−0.03	−0.11	−0.08	**−0.19**	−0.02	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Agreeableness	−0.08	−0.05	0.02	0.02	**0.16**	−0.11	−0.01	−0.05	−0.01	0.03	0.10	−0.08
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Conscientiousness	−0.04	**−0.16**	−0.04	−0.03	−0.04	0.13	0.11	−0.03	0.05	−0.09	−0.06	0.11
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Extraversion	0.07	−0.06	0.08	0.03	**0.13**	−0.04	0.01	0.02	0.04	**0.15**	−0.05	0.03
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Neuroticism	−0.02	0.05	−0.11	−0.05	−0.07	−0.01	0.02	−0.02	−0.07	0.04	−0.05	0.02
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Openness	0.04	**0.17**	−0.02	0.01	−0.07	−0.01	0.01	−0.02	0.09	0.12	0.09	0.09
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Risk Aversion	−0.05	0.02	−0.10	0.01	−0.04	−0.02	0.05	0.00	−0.02	0.07	−0.01	0.04
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)

Notes: $N = 360$. Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates that are significant at below 5% level are printed in bold. All matching variables are scaled by their standard deviation.

Table C.3: Regressions of Household Outcomes on GRA and on Predicted GRA

	Childcare		Housework		Market Work		Labor Income		Financial Decisions	
Predicted GRA Female	0.045***		0.039***		-0.063***		-0.066***		-0.017	
	(0.017)		(0.015)		(0.016)		(0.014)		(0.016)	
Predicted GRA Male	0.035*		0.052***		-0.040**		-0.027*		0.023	
	(0.018)		(0.016)		(0.018)		(0.015)		(0.017)	
GRA Female		0.031***		0.027***		-0.046***		-0.045***		-0.028***
		(0.009)		(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.009)
GRA Male		0.023**		0.026***		-0.026***		-0.024***		0.001
		(0.010)		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.009)
N	531	531	799	799	799	799	799	799	799	799

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.4: Affinity Matrix; Detrended Variables

	Female											
Male	Age	Education	BMI	Height	Health	GRA	Agreeableness	Conscientiousness	Extraversion	Neuroticism	Openness	Risk Aversion
Age	**1.13**	**−0.22**	0.01	0.06	0.06	−0.01	−0.04	0.06	**−0.11**	−0.01	0.03	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Education	0.01	**0.39**	**−0.07**	0.04	0.05	−0.03	**−0.11**	−0.03	−0.02	0.00	**0.12**	−0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
BMI	0.02	0.00	**0.19**	0.01	−0.01	0.05	0.06	0.00	−0.02	0.01	−0.07	−0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Height	0.01	0.07	0.05	**0.15**	**−0.07**	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.02	−0.02	0.01	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Health	0.02	0.06	**−0.08**	−0.04	**0.10**	−0.05	0.05	−0.00	0.02	−0.01	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
GRA	−0.05	0.05	0.04	−0.03	0.03	**0.50**	0.03	−0.04	−0.00	−0.01	**−0.09**	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Agreeableness	−0.04	0.03	**0.09**	−0.01	**0.07**	0.01	0.01	0.03	−0.03	0.05	**0.07**	−0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Conscientiousness	0.03	**−0.08**	0.03	−0.02	−0.02	0.02	0.06	−0.01	0.05	−0.07	−0.07	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Extraversion	−0.02	−0.03	−0.03	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.03	−0.01	0.01	0.03	−0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Neuroticism	0.01	0.04	0.01	−0.00	−0.06	−0.00	**0.09**	−0.06	**−0.08**	−0.04	−0.02	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Openness	0.02	0.04	−0.06	0.01	0.02	−0.04	−0.03	−0.03	0.03	0.05	**0.11**	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Risk Aversion	−0.03	0.03	−0.04	0.00	−0.04	−0.02	0.01	0.04	−0.00	0.04	−0.03	**0.13**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)

Notes: $N = 1,157$. Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates that are significant at below 5% level are printed in bold. All matching variables are scaled by their standard deviation.

Table C.5: Affinity Matrix; Including Employer-related GRA Question

	Female											
Male	Age	Education	BMI	Height	Health	GRA	Agreeableness	Conscientiousness	Extraversion	Neuroticism	Openness	Risk Aversion
Age	**1.13**	−0.08	0.01	**0.10**	**0.09**	−0.03	−0.06	0.07	−0.08	0.02	0.00	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Education	**0.13**	**0.43**	**−0.07**	0.04	0.06	−0.04	**−0.11**	−0.04	−0.01	0.01	**0.14**	−0.01
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
BMI	0.04	0.00	**0.21**	0.00	−0.00	0.04	0.05	0.00	−0.01	0.01	−0.06	−0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Height	0.01	0.06	0.05	**0.15**	−0.06	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.02	−0.01	0.01	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Health	0.06	**0.08**	**−0.09**	−0.05	**0.10**	−0.06	0.04	−0.01	0.04	−0.01	−0.02	−0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
GRA	0.01	0.02	0.05	−0.01	0.05	**0.51**	0.01	−0.06	0.02	0.02	**−0.07**	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Agreeableness	−0.06	0.01	**0.08**	−0.02	**0.08**	0.02	0.01	0.04	−0.02	0.05	**0.07**	−0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Conscientiousness	0.00	**−0.11**	0.04	0.01	−0.04	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.04	**−0.09**	**−0.09**	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Extraversion	−0.03	−0.01	−0.02	0.01	0.03	−0.02	0.02	0.03	−0.01	0.00	0.03	−0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Neuroticism	−0.00	0.04	0.01	−0.01	−0.06	0.00	**0.10**	−0.07	**−0.08**	−0.04	−0.03	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Openness	0.06	0.05	**−0.07**	0.00	0.02	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03	0.01	0.05	**0.11**	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Risk Aversion	−0.06	0.03	−0.05	0.01	−0.04	0.01	0.00	0.05	−0.01	0.05	−0.03	**0.14**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)

Notes: $N = 1,151$. Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates that are significant at below 5% level are printed in bold. All matching variables are scaled by their standard deviation.

Table C.6: Affinity Matrix; Controlling for Ethnicity

	Female												
Male	Age	Education	BMI	Height	Health	GRA	Agreeableness	Conscientiousness	Extraversion	Neuroticism	Openness	Risk Aversion	Ethnicity
Age	**1.03**	**−0.09**	0.01	0.07	0.07	−0.05	−0.03	0.05	**−0.13**	−0.02	0.01	0.02	
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	
Education	0.07	**0.46**	**−0.09**	0.03	**0.07**	**−0.09**	−0.05	−0.07	−0.02	0.03	**0.11**	0.00	
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
BMI	0.04	−0.00	**0.21**	−0.01	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.01	−0.00	0.01	−0.05	−0.02	
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Height	0.01	0.03	0.05	**0.21**	−0.02	**0.06**	−0.01	−0.01	0.03	0.00	−0.02	0.03	
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Health	0.05	**0.08**	**−0.08**	−0.02	**0.10**	−0.03	0.02	−0.02	0.03	−0.01	−0.00	−0.01	
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
GRA	−0.00	0.05	0.05	−0.01	**0.08**	**0.59**	−0.01	−0.02	−0.00	0.05	**−0.09**	**0.07**	
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Agreeableness	−0.06	0.03	**0.08**	−0.04	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.06	−0.04	
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Conscientiousness	0.03	**−0.10**	0.04	0.01	−0.01	0.01	0.05	0.02	0.01	**−0.07**	**−0.07**	0.05	
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Extraversion	−0.04	−0.04	−0.02	0.02	0.03	−0.01	0.05	0.04	−0.02	0.00	0.01	−0.02	
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Neuroticism	0.03	0.02	0.01	−0.00	−0.06	0.02	**0.08**	**−0.07**	**−0.08**	−0.04	−0.02	**0.06**	
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Openness	0.05	0.03	**−0.07**	0.00	0.01	−0.01	−0.04	−0.02	0.01	0.03	**0.11**	−0.00	
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Risk Aversion	0.01	0.04	−0.05	0.00	−0.02	−0.01	−0.01	0.03	0.01	**0.07**	−0.03	**0.18**	
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Ethnicity													**6.08**
													(0.81)

Notes: $N = 1,396$. Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates that are significant at below 5% level are printed in bold. All matching variables are scaled by their standard deviation.

Table C.7: Affinity Matrix; Controlling for Ethnic Similarity

	Female												
Male	Age	Education	BMI	Height	Health	GRA	Agreeableness	Conscientiousness	Extraversion	Neuroticism	Openness	Risk Aversion	Ethnicity
Age	**1.04**	**−0.10**	0.02	**0.09**	**0.08**	−0.04	−0.05	0.06	**−0.13**	−0.00	0.01	0.02	**0.16**
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Education	0.08	**0.44**	**−0.09**	0.04	**0.08**	**−0.08**	**−0.07**	−0.07	−0.00	0.04	**0.11**	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
BMI	0.03	−0.00	**0.21**	−0.01	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.01	−0.01	0.01	−0.05	−0.02	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Height	−0.01	0.05	0.04	**0.17**	−0.04	0.04	0.02	−0.02	0.02	−0.02	−0.01	0.05	−0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Health	0.05	**0.09**	**−0.08**	−0.03	**0.09**	−0.03	0.03	−0.02	0.02	−0.02	−0.00	−0.01	−0.00
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
GRA	−0.01	0.07	0.04	−0.03	0.07	**0.57**	−0.00	−0.03	−0.01	0.05	**−0.09**	**0.08**	−0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Agreeableness	−0.05	0.02	**0.08**	−0.02	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.06	−0.05	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Conscientiousness	0.02	**−0.10**	0.04	−0.00	−0.02	0.01	0.06	0.02	0.01	**−0.08**	**−0.07**	0.05	−0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Extraversion	−0.03	−0.04	−0.02	0.02	0.02	−0.01	0.05	0.04	−0.02	0.01	0.01	−0.02	−0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Neuroticism	0.02	0.03	0.00	−0.02	**−0.06**	0.01	**0.08**	**−0.07**	**−0.09**	−0.05	−0.02	**0.07**	−0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Openness	0.04	0.05	**−0.08**	−0.01	−0.00	−0.02	−0.03	−0.03	0.01	0.03	**0.11**	0.01	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Risk Aversion	0.01	0.03	−0.05	0.01	−0.02	−0.01	−0.01	0.03	0.00	**0.06**	−0.03	**0.17**	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Ethnicity	0.02	0.04	**0.13**	0.01	0.03	−0.03	**0.11**	0.03	−0.04	0.04	0.02	0.08	**0.53**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)

Notes: $N = 1,396$. Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates that are significant at below 5% level are printed in bold. All matching variables are scaled by their standard deviation.

D Robustness Checks

Figure D.1: Contribution to Childcare; Two SD Counterfactual Shift



Notes: The outcome variable is based on the survey question, 'Who is mainly responsible for looking after the children?' and is categorized as: (1) mainly self, (2) both, or (3) mainly partner.

Figure D.2: Contribution to Housework; Two SD Counterfactual Shift



Notes: Housework categories are defined by the wife's share of total weekly housework hours: mainly wife (70–100%), shared (30–70%), and mainly husband (0–30%).

Figure D.3: Contribution to Market Work; Two SD Counterfactual Shift



Notes: Market work is defined as the sum of weekly work hours and daily commuting time. Household categories are based on the wife's share of total couple market work: mainly wife (70–100%), shared (30–70%), and mainly husband (0–30%).

Figure D.4: Contribution to Labor Income; Two SD Counterfactual Shift



Notes: The outcome variable is based on total net personal income (net of taxes and national insurance). Household categories are defined by the wife's share of total couple income: mainly wife (70–100%), shared (30–70%), and mainly husband (0–30%).

Figure D.5: Contribution to Financial Decisions; Two SD Counterfactual Shift



Notes: The outcome variable is based on the survey question, 'In your household, who has the final say in big financial decisions?' and is categorized as: (1) mainly self, (2) both, or (3) mainly partner.

Table D.1: Average Marginal Effects; Using Males' Responses

	Childcare		Financial Decisions		Grocery Shopping		Cooking		Cleaning		Washing		Gardening		DIY Jobs	
	p(shared)	p(male)	p(shared)	p(male)	p(shared)	p(male)	p(shared)	p(male)	p(shared)	p(male)	p(shared)	p(male)	p(shared)	p(male)	p(shared)	p(male)
Index 1 (male)	0.02	0.00	−0.00	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	−0.03	0.01	−0.05	0.03	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	[0.37]	[0.50]	[0.86]	[0.01]	[0.26]	[0.39]	[1.00]	[0.69]	[0.12]	[0.23]	[0.01]	[0.04]	[0.85]	[1.00]	[0.97]	[0.99]
Index 2 (male)	0.07	0.01	−0.00	−0.02	0.02	0.03	−0.06	0.02	−0.07	0.03	−0.03	0.02	−0.01	0.02	0.00	−0.00
	[0.00]	[0.34]	[0.89]	[0.12]	[0.13]	[0.05]	[0.00]	[0.17]	[0.00]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.04]	[0.32]	[0.14]	[0.96]	[0.94]
Index 3 (male)	0.01	0.00	0.00	−0.01	−0.00	−0.01	−0.00	0.00	0.01	−0.00	0.05	−0.03	−0.00	0.02	−0.00	0.00
	[0.56]	[0.43]	[0.95]	[0.23]	[0.75]	[0.37]	[0.83]	[0.53]	[0.71]	[0.72]	[0.01]	[0.00]	[0.43]	[0.22]	[0.98]	[0.98]
Index 4 (male)	0.02	0.00	−0.00	−0.02	−0.01	−0.01	0.02	−0.01	−0.01	0.01	−0.03	0.02	−0.01	0.02	−0.01	0.02
	[0.14]	[0.39]	[0.99]	[0.17]	[0.29]	[0.26]	[0.17]	[0.34]	[0.35]	[0.47]	[0.06]	[0.07]	[0.34]	[0.23]	[0.19]	[0.23]
Index 5 (male)	0.01	0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.01	0.00	−0.04	0.02	−0.02	0.01	−0.01	0.03	−0.01	0.02
	[0.46]	[0.55]	[0.81]	[0.98]	[0.77]	[0.75]	[0.52]	[0.57]	[0.01]	[0.06]	[0.14]	[0.14]	[0.17]	[0.03]	[0.21]	[0.25]
Index 1 (female)	0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.06	−0.03	−0.03	0.02	−0.00	0.06	−0.03	0.07	−0.04	0.02	−0.05	0.01	−0.02
	[0.94]	[0.99]	[0.94]	[0.01]	[0.12]	[0.05]	[0.31]	[0.62]	[0.00]	[0.03]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.15]	[0.01]	[0.20]	[0.24]
Index 2 (female)	0.04	0.01	−0.00	−0.02	0.00	0.00	−0.02	0.01	−0.02	0.01	−0.02	0.01	−0.01	0.03	0.00	−0.00
	[0.00]	[0.47]	[0.85]	[0.20]	[0.91]	[0.84]	[0.12]	[0.22]	[0.21]	[0.44]	[0.22]	[0.18]	[0.23]	[0.05]	[0.75]	[0.74]
Index 3 (female)	−0.04	−0.01	−0.00	0.01	−0.01	−0.02	0.06	−0.02	0.05	−0.02	0.03	−0.02	−0.01	0.02	−0.01	0.01
	[0.01]	[0.33]	[0.84]	[0.17]	[0.25]	[0.12]	[0.00]	[0.22]	[0.00]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.00]	[0.40]	[0.19]	[0.32]	[0.36]
Index 4 (female)	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	−0.00	0.06	−0.03	0.04	−0.02	−0.00	0.01	−0.01	0.03
	[0.97]	[0.97]	[0.98]	[0.05]	[0.88]	[0.95]	[0.69]	[0.68]	[0.00]	[0.02]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.58]	[0.54]	[0.04]	[0.10]
Index 5 (female)	0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.01	−0.00	−0.00	0.01	−0.00	0.02	−0.01	0.03	−0.02	0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00
	[0.86]	[0.87]	[0.97]	[0.47]	[0.97]	[1.00]	[0.32]	[0.43]	[0.11]	[0.16]	[0.06]	[0.06]	[0.62]	[0.85]	[0.98]	[0.95]
Exp. Match Quality	−0.02	−0.00	0.00	−0.01	0.01	0.01	−0.01	0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.01	−0.01	0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.01
	[0.16]	[0.01]	[0.95]	[0.24]	[0.00]	[0.28]	[0.48]	[0.16]	[1.00]	[1.00]	[0.08]	[0.24]	[0.96]	[0.96]	[0.49]	[0.56]

Notes: Table reports average marginal effects from ordered probit regressions. The dependent variable categories are (1) mainly female, (2) shared, and (3) mainly male, based on the male's reports. Effects for 'mainly female' are omitted for brevity, as marginal effects across all categories sum to zero. *P*-values are in parentheses.

Table D.2: Average Marginal Effects; Using Alternative Thresholds to Categorize Household Outcomes

	Thresholds 35%/65%						Thresholds 40%/60%					
	Housework		Market Work		Labor Income		Housework		Market Work		Labor Income	
	p(shared)	p(male)	p(shared)	p(male)	p(shared)	p(male)	p(shared)	p(male)	p(shared)	p(male)	p(shared)	p(male)
Index 1 (male)	0.01	0.01	0.00	−0.01	−0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	−0.01	−0.01	0.01
	[0.47]	[0.34]	[0.56]	[0.47]	[0.41]	[0.40]	[0.46]	[0.40]	[0.70]	[0.66]	[0.45]	[0.44]
Index 2 (male)	0.04	0.03	0.03	−0.06	0.05	−0.08	0.04	0.04	0.03	−0.07	0.04	−0.07
	[0.00]	[0.08]	[0.16]	[0.00]	[0.01]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.05]	[0.09]	[0.00]	[0.01]	[0.00]
Index 3 (male)	−0.02	−0.01	−0.00	−0.01	0.00	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	0.00	−0.01	0.01	−0.02
	[0.04]	[0.16]	[0.96]	[0.29]	[0.78]	[0.52]	[0.09]	[0.18]	[0.78]	[0.39]	[0.32]	[0.26]
Index 4 (male)	0.00	0.00	0.01	−0.01	0.01	−0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	−0.02	0.01	−0.02
	[0.71]	[0.72]	[0.49]	[0.24]	[0.17]	[0.12]	[0.60]	[0.64]	[0.39]	[0.22]	[0.14]	[0.10]
Index 5 (male)	−0.00	−0.00	0.01	−0.03	0.02	−0.04	−0.00	−0.00	0.01	−0.03	0.02	−0.04
	[1.00]	[1.00]	[0.24]	[0.02]	[0.05]	[0.01]	[0.75]	[0.76]	[0.16]	[0.02]	[0.04]	[0.01]
Index 1 (female)	−0.04	−0.03	−0.00	0.00	0.01	−0.02	−0.03	−0.03	−0.00	0.01	0.01	−0.02
	[0.00]	[0.09]	[0.96]	[0.98]	[0.32]	[0.27]	[0.00]	[0.08]	[0.67]	[0.68]	[0.34]	[0.30]
Index 2 (female)	0.01	0.00	0.03	−0.06	0.04	−0.06	0.01	0.01	0.03	−0.06	0.03	−0.05
	[0.43]	[0.52]	[0.16]	[0.00]	[0.02]	[0.00]	[0.32]	[0.37]	[0.10]	[0.00]	[0.03]	[0.00]
Index 3 (female)	−0.03	−0.02	−0.04	0.09	−0.08	0.12	−0.03	−0.03	−0.04	0.10	−0.07	0.13
	[0.00]	[0.12]	[0.17]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.08]	[0.07]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]
Index 4 (female)	−0.01	−0.00	0.01	−0.02	−0.00	0.01	−0.00	−0.00	0.01	−0.02	−0.01	0.03
	[0.44]	[0.47]	[0.44]	[0.19]	[0.63]	[0.63]	[0.65]	[0.63]	[0.41]	[0.25]	[0.10]	[0.07]
Index 5 (female)	−0.01	−0.00	0.01	−0.02	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	0.01	−0.01	0.00	−0.00
	[0.58]	[0.60]	[0.29]	[0.14]	[0.78]	[0.79]	[0.61]	[0.63]	[0.38]	[0.33]	[0.89]	[0.88]
Exp. Match Quality	0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.01
	[0.61]	[0.71]	[0.74]	[0.66]	[0.78]	[0.76]	[0.63]	[0.71]	[1.00]	[1.00]	[0.26]	[0.41]

Notes: Table reports average marginal effects from ordered probit regressions. The dependent variables are categorical: (1) mainly female, (2) shared, and (3) mainly male. Columns 2–7 and 8–13 present sensitivity checks using alternative classification thresholds. In the first specification (columns 2–7), the categories are defined by the wife's share falling within [65, 100], [35, 65), and [0, 35) percent, respectively. The second specification (columns 8–13) applies thresholds of [60, 100], [40, 60), and [0, 40). Marginal effects for the mainly female category are omitted, as the effects across all outcomes sum to zero. *P*-values are reported in parentheses.